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“Nothing is ever truly new2”: The persisting digital exclusion in Israel, 2002-2013 
 
Data about digital exclusion in Israel are being collected at least since the beginning of 
the century. Reporting them, however, has mostly been time-specific and in some 
instances population-specific. Most studies neglect the sense of continuity of the divide 
and focus on the gap at a given point in time, even though that in order “to make 
statements and to test hypotheses about trends in computer or Internet penetration, it is 
necessary to have longitudinal or time-series data” (van Dijk & Hacker, 2003, p.316). 
This study, thus, describes and analyzes the divide in Israel over time and by doing so 
acknowledges the digital divide as a dynamic process. We demonstrate that despite the 
massive penetration of new technologies to Israel, those with the least digital capital, 
remain at the bottom of the divide and do not close the gap. We try to explain why by 
using literature about social fissures in Israeli society and incorporating the digital 
exclusion model developed by van Dijk (2005). 
Indeed, in order to examine the digital divide in a given society, it is not only 
necessary to use longitudinal data but also to understand both economic and other social 
patterns of exclusion. We aim to analyze changes over time of both information and 
communication technologies (ICT) possession and patterns of use in Israel. Based on data 
derived from the census and annual surveys conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) on ICT possession, Internet connectivity and patterns of use, we paint a picture of 
the trends in these measures between 2002 and 2013, from the launch of broadband to the 
latest date for which data is available.  
The CBS conducts annual social surveys in which computer usage as well as 
Internet connectivity and use are questioned. These are discussed in the results section, as 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2587756 
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we processed them in order to create a multi-year multi-population picture. While a 
majority of the reports we found discussing the digital divide in Israel base their analysis 
on CBS statistics, rarely do they take a longitudinal approach and none have tried to 
analyze trends over a decade. In addition, a number of ministries and government 
agencies, think tanks, civil society organizations and independent researchers conducted 
surveys aiming at highlighting challenges to digital inclusion. We gathered and review 
those as well. 
The analysis identifies the expanded elements of van Dijk’s (2005) dynamic 
digital exclusion model (Schejter, Ben Harush & Tirosh, 2015) and adapts them to the 
social cleavages and patterns of exclusion existing in Israeli society. The analysis takes 
into account the unique contours of Israeli society and describes differences in ICT 
possession and use along the lines that cut through it: population group 
(Jewish/Palestinian), income, Jewish ethnicity (Europe/America – Asia/Africa origin), 
immigrant-Israel born, and level of religiosity (within the Jewish community). 
Differences in ICT use are annualy checked with regards to use for economic and social 
activities. Indeed, while the study focuses on Israel, some of these differences and gaps 
exist in many other nations, and both the data and the analysis can contribute to an 
international comparative conversation on digital exclusion patterns.  
Only “very few studies reported on how government intervention can encourage 
disadvantaged people to adopt more ICTs and their contents.” (Srinuan & Bohlin, 2011, 
p.19) In order to change the discourse, digital exclusion studies should suggest a new 
paradigm for analysis. This paradigm requires a different understanding of both what 
makes today’s media different and of what their potential is to allow participation in 
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society to groups that are being excluded over time, and for whom exclusion is an 
ongoing experience (Schejter & Tirosh, 2014; Schejter & Tirosh, 2015). Policies should 
focus on those that are excluded and be designed to offer them participation in the realms 
they define as those they need. 
In order to inform the policy debate of this need, we start by setting the theoretical 
background – presenting the dynamic model of digital exclusion and highlighting the 
elements that affect it. We then review the existing time specific literature that has 
described digital exclusion in Israel since about the turn of the century. Digital exclusion 
in Israel is described within the context of four of the five social cleavages that endure in 
Israel and that have been identified by Smooha (1993): national, ethnic, religious and 
economic3. Not all have been studied in this context and we point to this lacuna in 
research. We then describe the longitudinal data we collected and analyzed using data 
derived from annual studies conducted by the CBS and we conclude by describing what 
we see as the direction to be taken by policy. 
From digital divide to digital exclusion 
 
Regulating communications is fundamentally different from the regulation of other 
industries in three aspects: its unique potential for social and political impact; the 
ambiguity of classification of decisions along economic or social regulatory lines; and the 
potential overlap and interaction between economic and social concerns within individual 
decisions (Napoli, 1999). Indeed, in the transition towards full realization of the 
“informational state” (which is replacing the bureaucratic welfare state) communication 
regulation is an important mechanism for manifesting power (Braman, 2009).  
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 Policies regarding the “digital divide” serve as a good example for the connection 
between communication policy and power relations as those at the “bottom” of the divide 
are deprived from empowering social capacities. In other words, the digital divide should 
not be seen as a divide between have and have-not of things digital but rather as a divide 
between those who have power and the powerless.     
One successful attempt in conceptualizing the digital divide from a power 
relations perspective, and assessing the social impact of the differences in access to and 
utilization of digital communication technologies, was developed by van Dijk (2005) who 
offered a dynamic model (figure 1), which explains both the creation of the divide and its 
persistence over time. In his words:  
“1. Categorical inequalities in society produce an unequal distribution of 
resources; 2. An unequal distribution of resources causes unequal access 
to digital technologies; 3. Unequal access to digital technologies also 
depends on the characteristics of these technologies; 4. Unequal access 
to digital technologies brings about unequal participation in society; 5. 
Unequal participation in society reinforces categorical inequalities and 
unequal distributions of resources.” (p. 15)  
Indeed, as the model demonstrates, the impact of inequality is the exclusion of 
individuals from participation; hence the outcome of the digital divide is the exclusion 
from participating in social processes, which in the informational state are more and more 
dependent on digital experiences and capabilities.  
It is most common to agree that socio-economic differences drive the digital 
divide and the technological exclusion it creates (i.e. Jansen, 2010; Talukdar & Gauri, 
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2011; Cruz-Jesus, Oliveira & Bacao, 2012). However, socio-economic differences in 
themselves do not emerge out of thin air, but rather they are the consequence of deep-
rooted patterns of marginalization based on social exclusion. Van Dijk’s model (figure 1) 
acknowledges that digital exclusion is a reflection of other social differences and an 
ongoing process fed by those differences. In his model, these differences lead to 
economic inequality and maintain it. To understand digital exclusion and its origins, we 
need therefore to identify the social circumstances leading to it, the pattern of inequality 
that emerges from those circumstances, the elements of ICTs that those excluded are 
excluded from and the arena of participation they are excluded from. Hence, in order to 
tackle the persistent digital divide in a given society and to better understand it as a social 
phenomenon the building blocks of Van Dijk’s model need to be elaborated upon.  
 
figure 1 
personal and 
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We propose, thus, an elaborated digital exclusion model (figure 2). Our model 
breaks down van-Dijk’s model and identifies the building blocks in each element of the 
process. First, in identifying the “personal and positional categorical inequalities,” which 
are relational and drive differences in resources. Then we suggest to use Selwyn’s (2004) 
theoretical examination of digital exclusion and identification of the different types of 
capital that are distributed unevenly and the types of access they affect in order to 
pinpoint the different types of resources of which there is unequal distribution and the 
types of access to ICT’s that are affected by them. Listing what we think are the specific 
characteristics of contemporary media (Schejter & Tirosh, 2014; 2015) serves to assess 
the quality of ICT usage provided to individuals, and helps understand the contribution of 
imbalanced access to them (which could be expressed in either lack of, or over-
dependence on one or more characteristic) to participation levels in society, and to the 
maintenance of socio-economic inequality and technological exclusion.  
 
figure 2 
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The environments that drive socio-demographic differences to affect socio-
economic disparities are circumstance-specific to economic and social units with distinct 
historical backgrounds and other geo-political peculiarities. However, whatever the social 
distinctions are, they lead to socio-economic inequality. This commonality allows 
observations of technological exclusion to be conceptualized to a level of theorizing.  
Our refined model proposal (as presented in figure 2), also limits the circular 
motion to movement between the reduced level of participation and the socio-economic 
status, since the categorical inequalities that feed it, while constructed, are deeply rooted, 
and remedying them needs to start with the betterment of socio-economic stratification 
first, a goal that is achievable through separate public policies that are not necessarily 
connected to media or ICTs. The policy scheme arising from the empirical analysis we 
propose to conduct will identify, we believe, those most disadvantaged and will allow 
making corrective and redistributive policies the goal of ICT policy (Schejter & Tirosh, 
2015). 
In this study we seek to demonstrate some elements of this dynamic model using 
Israel as an example. We identify longitudinal patterns of inequality in access as they 
apply to categorical differences created by the cleavages in Israeli society. We show the 
difference in computer use and access to the Internet as well as the difference in usage 
over time for both economic and social activities. The latter helps us demonstrate how the 
relationship between categorical inequalities and access to ICTs feeds the circular effect 
that the maintenance of these inequalities carries over time.  
Israeli social cleavages and their influence on digital exclusion 
Studies analyzing the digital divide in Israeli society have mostly focused on a specific 
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moment in time and more often than not describe the gaps in a framework that is bereft of 
reference to continuity (i.e.. Lev-On and Lissitsa (2010); The Galilee Society, 2010; 
Alfasi, 2011). Yet, in order to better understand the actual situation of digital exclusion in 
Israel we should first, as the model suggests, identify the categorical inequalities in Israeli 
society and only then seek more information about the digital divide.  
Conflict has become such a constant factor in Israeli identity that it has been 
referred to as inherent to Israeli society. This constant conflict in Israel can be identified 
along five social cleavages: national, ethnic, political, religious observance and class 
(Smooha, 1993).  
The National Cleavage  
The national conflict between Jews and Arabs precedes the establishment of Israel in 
1948, yet the wars of 1948 and 1967 have led to the eventual control of an Arab minority 
by a Jewish majority, both within Israel and in territories occupied by Israel but never 
annexed to the state. The Palestinians residing within Israel, who are citizens of the state, 
comprise approximately 20 percent of the population.4 The tension between these two 
populations is the most apparent social cleavage characterizing Israel. 
As a result, a wide range of studies has focused on Palestinian citizens of Israel 
and their ‘digital’ situation.  Using a diffusion of innovations perspective (Rogers, 2003), 
Ghanaeem, Rafaeli and Azaiza (2009) use two datasets, one from the CBS regarding the 
Jewish community and one by the Galilee Society, both from 2004. They added a later 
dataset from 2007, thus offering the only study to date in which there was an attempt to 
describe a trend over time. Their findings show that in the earlier period, while 50 percent 
of Jews used the Internet, only one in six Palestinian Israelis did. A regression analysis 
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demonstrated that the best predictor for the gap, though, is education. The weakest groups 
with regards to internet usage were those with low levels of education, Muslims, rural 
residents, those residing in the south of Israel, dwellers of unrecognized Bedouin villages, 
and women.   
Lev-On and Lissitsa (2010) tested these assumptions, basing their analyses on the 
2008 CBS social survey. The regressions they conducted revealed that the probability 
that Palestinians use the Internet was lower than the probability that Jews use it by some 
70 percent but that controlling for age, gender, religiosity, education (years of schooling), 
income and residential area (center/periphery), reduces the ethnic gap and Palestinians 
are only 43 percent less likely than Jews to use the Internet, when other conditions are 
held equal (Ibid). They also found that Internet usage increases with education (years of 
formal schooling) and income, and decreases with age and religiosity. Interestingly, their 
results show that the effect of education is much stronger among the Palestinian Israelis 
than among the Jewish Israelis: Indeed, each year of education contributes more to the 
probability that Palestinians use the Internet, than to the probability that Jews do so (other 
things being equal). Another striking effect in their study identifies the role of religion in 
both communities. When controlling for the unique influence of religiosity and education 
the Palestinians were more likely to use the Internet than Jews. The negative effect of the 
interaction between ethnicity and religiosity indicates that with regards to Internet usage 
the influence of religion is more dominant among Jews than among Arabs. 
Avidar (2009) administered a phone-based survey of a representative sample of 
the Israeli population involving 1,410 subjects ages 18 and up. The study found 53 
percent access rates among Palestinians, compared to 63.8 percent among Jews. 
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Moreover, some online activities were prominent among Palestinians but not among 
Jews; for example, 27.6 percent of Palestinian Internet users reported using chat rooms, 
significantly more than the 11.7 percent among Jews. The access gap between 
Palestinians and Jews seemed to decrease with age, hence the younger population better 
bridges the digital divide. In general, ethnicity, income, education, gender and age were 
all significant predictors of Internet usage (Avidar, 2009, p. 49). 
Later data published by the Galilee Society (Galilee Society, 2010) states that 
only 59.5 percent of Palestinian households in Israel owned at the time a personal 
computer, up from 49.6 percent in 2007 and 44.6 percent in 2004. This was true in 
particular in the South where computer ownership rose from 30 percent in 2007 to 36 
percent in 2010, while in the North penetration was as high as 65.2 percent, compared to 
the national average at the time of 71.1 percent. Among households with computers, 
connectivity to the Internet increased from 69.8 percent in 2007 to nearly 90 percent by 
2010. 55.2 percent of total Palestinian households were connected at the time as 
compared to 33.8 percent in 2007 and only 23 percent in 2004. 
The short lived “Internet Ratings Council,” which was established in 2011 in 
order to provide data regarding traffic to web sites for advertising purposes and folded in 
2013 published a few reports focusing on specific topics. In its June 2012 report 
comparing between the Palestinian Israeli and the Jewish Israeli communities5, the 
Council noted that Muslim Palestinian Israelis consist 12.4 percent of Internet users aged 
7 and up while their share in the population that year was 17.1 percent.6  The report 
highlighted differences in uses among these populations as well. As the Council’s 
mandate was assessing the Internet’s impact on and for advertising and advertisers, the 
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report focused on purchasing activities. It found that among the Jewish population men 
and women reported equally their involvement in online purchasing (41 and 43 percent 
respectively), while among the Palestinians, the ratio of men (44 percent) almost doubled 
that of women (25 percent). The goods purchased were generally similar, except for the 
fact that among Jews purchasing tickets for entertainment tripled the same activity among 
Palestinians, which echoed the fact that in ranking the types of web sites they visit, Jews 
ranked entertainment (more than 25 percent) third (following news and blogs/forums), 
while Palestinians ranked entertainment (about 7 percent) only seventh. 
The latest (and so far last) volume of the annual book “Arab Society in Israel,” 
(Gharrah, 2013), the most comprehensive statistical effort documenting economic, social 
and demographic changes in the Palestinian Israeli society and conducted intermittently 
since 2002, refers only in passing to internet connectivity. It cites a 2010 study according 
to which 48.8 percent of Palestinian Israeli households were connected to the Internet, as 
compared to 47 percent the year before (Gharrah, 2012). This is in comparison to Jewish 
households where connectivity levels were at 71.9 and 70 percent respectively.  
Interestingly, the report states that in the area densely populated by Palestinians 
known as the “triangle,” which is at the northern part of central Israel, Internet 
penetration was more than 83 percent. At the end of 2008 according to this report, 
penetration in Palestinian towns and villages with a population of 500-2000 ranged 
anywhere from 32 to 98 percent; in towns and villages with a population of 2000-10000 
between 32 and 96 percent; and in towns and villages with a population of more than 
10000, between 40.5 and 82.9 percent.  
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A unique place within the Palestinian citizens of Israel is held by the Bedouin. A 
single study of Bedouin life reported a statistical overview of ICT and Internet access 
among this population (Abu Bader and Gardos, 2011). The study presents data collected 
from different sources comparing the Bedouin to other Arab citizens of Israel. According 
to data dated to 2007, while 32.2 percent of Israeli Palestinians reported using the 
Internet, only 17.8 percent of Bedouin over the age of 10 in the South of Israel did. The 
highest rate of Internet usage within age groups was among the 10-24 years old, and men 
predominantly used the Internet more than women. While only 67.5 percent of Bedouin 
using the Internet did so from home, compared to 87.8 percent of Palestinian Israelis, 
59.8 percent of Southern Bedouins used the Internet mainly from school, compared to 
only 22.9 percent of other Israeli Arabs. Similar gaps existed regarding computer use in 
general, with 32.2 percent among the Southern Bedouin as compared to 45.8 percent 
among other Israeli Arabs. 49.5 percent of Israeli Arabs had at the time an email address, 
but only 10.9 percent of the Bedouin did.  
The Ethnic Cleavage 
The ethnic cleavage in the Israeli context is rooted in the historical divergence within the 
Jewish tradition between Jews originating from Europe and America (predominantly 
referred to as Ashkenazi) and those originating from Middle Eastern countries and the 
Balkans (predominantly referred to as Sephardi). Both groups are more or less equal in 
size.  During a dramatic immigration wave in the 1950s, a Jewish population of only 
600,000, mainly from Ashkenazi background absorbed more than one million 
immigrants, most of them Sephardim. In the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
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caused more than a million immigrants from the former Soviet republics to immigrate to 
Israel. Thus, complicating even more the ethnic tensions in the Israeli society.  
Jews of Ethiopian origin are a distinct group among the immigrants, which 
arrived in Israel in three waves during the 1980’s, 1990’s and 2000’s respectively. While 
observing unique traditions, their absorption into Israeli society has been tumultuous, 
characterized by discrimination and paternalism by the absorbing majority. Both waves, 
along with the trickle of immigrants over its whole history have been a source for social 
conflict, which has also been translated to socioeconomic differences (Bar-Haim & 
Semyonov, 2015).   
Surprisingly, while Israel is an immigrant state, and even though the immigrant-
old timer tension affects the ethnic and national cleavages, there is hardly any literature 
on its relation to the digital divide. One study defying this genralization was conducted 
among Jews who emigrated from Ethiopia between 1979-1991, twenty years after their 
arrival in the country, which demonstrates that 64 percent of their households had a 
computer, 14 percent had both a desktop an a laptop, and 57 percent were connected to 
the Internet (King, Fishman & Walde-Tzadik, 2012). 
 An analysis of the data compiled in the CBS’ annual social survey points out to 
differences in what some researchers defined as “instrumental use” of ICTs (sending and 
receiving emails, searching, payments and online shopping) (Lissitsa & Chachashvili-
Bolotin, 2013). Data compiled in 2008-09, shows there was an advantage in the level of 
these uses for immigrants from Europe/America and old-timers over immigrants from the 
former Soviet Union and Ethiopia (Ibid). Inequality in these uses, they state, may result 
in the furtherance of socioeconomic inequalities. 
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The Religious observance cleavage 
Differentiating among Jews along the lines of religious observances is a complex task. It 
has to do both with level of observance – ranging from ultra-orthodox worshipping 
associated with the Haredi community to secularism, with many shades of adherence to 
religious laws and traditions in between – and with traditions of observance along the 
Ashkenazi/Sephardi lines. These latter differences contribute to identity politics relevant 
to this study as well, while the former affect willful non-adoption of ICT’s as a result of 
religious dogma prohibitions. Yet, these differences are indeed a source of conflict in 
Israeli society as different struggles regarding the desired design of the Israeli public 
sphere are motivated by conflicting perspectives on how to observe Judaism.  
While the religious divide within the Jewish-Israeli society is, as stated, one of its 
outstanding features, the digital exclusion of members of the religious community is 
characteristically different than that of other communities. A major reason for it is the 
dictate of the community’s leaders, rather than an inability to connect created by external 
barriers such as socioeconomic status, poor infrastructure, language or culture. The 
Internet challenges the religious lifestyle (Lev-On & Neriya-Ben Shahar, 2011) and in the 
1990’s most of the significant leaders of the Haredi community signed a declaration 
warning the community from connecting to the Internet (Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai, 
undated).7 
 Data regarding Internet connectivity taking into account religious affiliation is all 
gathered from the annual surveys of the CBS.  This is true regarding a report submitted to 
the Knesset’s science and technology committee in 2007 (Godschmidt, 2007) as well as 
regarding a report submitted to the ministry of industry, trade and employment in 2009 
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(Malhi, 2009). The studies, while repeating the accepted axioms regarding growing fear 
of the Internet as levels of religiosity grow, are all reflective of the years in which they 
were published. Exceptional in this sense, however, is the latter. In acknowledging that 
the sample of the Haredi sector is very small on an annual basis, the researcher 
amalgamated the results of five years in order to reach some “multi-year average,” in his 
words. The study, based on data collected as late as 2007, stated that 10.3 percent of the 
Haredi sector were connected to the Internet from home, as compared to nearly 85 
percent of the “traditional” and secular populations. Haredi Men (27 percent) were more 
connected at home than women (22.5 percent).  
 While the study states that the levels of Internet usage within the Haredi 
community for leisure, communicating and seeking information are low, they are not 
negligible. 13.2 percent of men and 9.5 percent of women used electronic mail; only 14.6 
percent (compared to 61.5 percent among traditional and secular) used the Internet to 
search for information; and only 4 percent (as compared to 15.5 percent in the traditional-
secular population) used the Internet for shopping. 
Class  
Like all Western societies, Israel demonstrates socio-economic gaps. There is a widening 
earning gap between the major demographic groups in Israeli society (Haberfeld & 
Cohen, 2007). This gap persists along gender and ethnic lines, and is characterized by 
discrimination along national lines.  
Studies pointed out that computer ownership in the top decile of income rose 
between 1997-2002 from 56 to 74 percent and in the lowest decile from 12 to 30 percent. 
In addition, connectivity to the Internet rose in the highest level of income from 15 to 51 
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percent, but in the lowest only from one to six percent. Hence, while the difference in 
computer ownership stayed constant in percentage points (44 percent), the gap in 
connectivity rose from 14 to 44 percentage points in those early years (Toren, 2006). 
Comprehensive studies 
A few studies tackled the Israeli digital divide from a perspective that seeks to 
find general patterns of the divide without focusing on a particular social cleavage.  
Government researchers identified the relationship between existing social cleavages – 
including Jewish-Arab, religious-secular, old-timer-immigrant, young-old – and the 
digital divide, at least as early as 2003, and defined the divide as a “dim copy” of those 
differences as well as of differences in education and income levels (Toren, 2006). Gaps 
existed, they reiterated, even in the same town, neighborhood and building.  
When broadband was just being introduced in Israel, the gap in Internet access 
was apparent along religion, education and age. 35 percent of Jews had access to the 
Internet, 24 percent among Christians, 13 percent among Druze and only 10 percent 
among Muslims. Among those with a PhD, 71 percent had access, 58 percent among 
those with a bachelor’s degree, 46 percent among those with high school matriculation 
diplomas, 21 percent among high school non-matriculating graduates and only ten 
percent among those with less than a high school education.  When it comes to age, 51 
percent of those 20-24 years old reported they were connected to the Internet in 2002, 
while only 33 percent of those 40-44 and 13 percent of those 60-64 reported the same 
(Toren, 2006). 
In 2005 the ministry of finance published a survey on “e-readiness and digital 
divides,” based on a phone survey of a representative sample of 1,230 Israelis (Mizrachi 
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et al., 2005). The survey identified that approximately 75 percent of households had a 
computer at home, and that about half of the adults and three quarters of the youth used a 
computer. It also identified significantly less use among those older than 65, among the 
religious and Haredi communities, among Palestinian-Israelis, among those with less 
than a high school graduation education, among those with less than an average income, 
among immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and among first generation immigrants 
of North African/Middle Eastern origin. 
In 2007, the Knesset Information and Research Center analyzed data collected 
from the CBS’s annual social survey of 2005. The analysis demonstrated that 52.9 
percent of adults ages 20-64 use the Internet. There was a small gender gap in usage (56.7 
percent for men, 49.2% for women), but a large gap of more than 40 percentage points 
between Jews (59.8 percent) and Palestinians (18.95 percent) and between those with a 
high school matriculation diploma (68.3 percent) and those without (25.6 percent) 
(Goldschmidt, 2007). Still, in a policy paper from the same year developed at the 
ministry of finance, the authors state that along four levels of digital gaps – awareness, 
infrastructure, skills and personal and organizational capabilities – the gaps do not 
conform clearly along the traditional boundaries between north and south, center and 
periphery, European/American and Middle Eastern, poor and rich and so forth.8  
The short lived “Internet Ratings Council” published a report on the “Internet in 
Israel” in 2012. It found a generational gap, according to which while 97 percent of 15-17 
year olds surfed the Internet, only 45.7 percent of those over 65 years old did. Indeed, 
Internet use was above 80 percent in all age groups except for those above 45 years of 
age. Their survey, based on a panel of 30,000 surfers a month, found virtually no 
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difference in patterns of Internet use between Jews and Palestinians and between men and 
women. As far as religiosity was concerned, secular Jews were the most avid surfers (90 
percent reported surfing), followed by the Druze (83.3 percent) and Christians (81.8 
percent). Among Jews, those self-identifying as “religious” were more on the Internet 
(77.8 percent) than those self-identifying as “traditional” (70.5 percent) and far more than 
those considering themselves Haredi (36.4 percent).9  
In 2012, Google funded a comprehensive study of the digital divide in Israel 
(Dror & Gershon, 2012). Its authors state that its uniqueness was in that it took an in-
depth look at specific minority communities as well as on younger children. Its 
conclusions were that the digital divide has not yet been eliminated. The study identified 
an income gap -- nearly 85 percent of Israeli citizens with an above average income were 
connected but only 55 percent of those with an income lower than the average were 
connected as well; an ethnic gap – less than 60 percent of Palestinian citizens were 
connected to the Internet, compared to 70 percent of “veteran Jewish Israelis” and over 
75 percent of recent Jewish immigrants; a religious gap – whereas while only 7.5 percent 
of secular Jews were not connected to the Internet at all, while the rate among the Haredi 
community was more than 58 percent;  and an age gap – as 92 percent of youngsters aged 
12-17 reported being online as compared with only half of  those 55 or older. 
Theorizing the nature of the Israeli digital divide has, however, been less 
extensive. One insightful effort sets the stage for understanding the divide within the 
context of the social cleavages that characterize Israel (Mesch, Talmud & Kolobov, 
2013).  Focusing on ethno-national inequalities, Mesch, Talmud and Kolobov (2013) 
juxtapose inequality from a conflict perspective, with that of inequality from a cultural 
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perspective and conclude that their results  
“tend to support the cultural perspective for explaining inequalities in the use of 
digital technology. Despite the existence of ethnic differences in the level of 
schooling and income between Arabs, Jews from the FSU and native-born Israeli 
Jews, we found that the main inequality in access was between Israeli Jews and 
Israeli Arabs. Furthermore, this inequality was explained by variations in 
occupational prestige and attitudes toward technology.” (Ibid, p. 232)  
The study 
As presented virtually all “digital divide” studies focus on a point in time in which the 
study was conducted and on a particular “divide” issue studied, be it the demographics of 
the populations or the ICT-usage skills they have or lack. Our study aims to analyze 
changes over time of both ICT possession and patterns of use in Israel. Based on data 
derived from the census and annual surveys conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
on both ICT possession and patterns of use, we paint a picture of the trends in ICT 
possession and use between the introduction of broadband in 2002 and 2013, which is the 
latest date for which data is available. 
The raw data from the CBS was organized according to the categories identified 
in previous research regarding social cleavages in Israeli society. We then developed 
longitudinal descriptions along each of the categories that were identified by the CBS as 
well: the national (which the CBS calls “population group”), the religious affiliation, the 
socioeconomic, the immigrant status and the Jewish ethnic origin. We also controlled the 
socioeconomic data with some factors, to determine which one was dominant. In order to 
simplify the ability to read the data, along the socioeconomic divide we focused on two 
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groups: those with an average income and those with a low level of income (the bottom 
decile). 
Within each of these categories we collected two types of data, the first – 
referring to possession of computers and access to the Internet; the second – referring to 
two types of uses of the Internet: for economic activities (including work, shopping 
online and making electronic payments), and for social activities. We thus can see the 
long-term relationship between the categorical inequalities, their socioeconomic 
ramifications, the effect on access to ICTs, and the levels of participation in society in 
economic and social arenas. 
Results 
General 
Internet penetration has more than doubled in Israel since the introduction of broadband 
in the beginning of the 21st century. As figure 3 demonstrates, until 2010 there was a  
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constant upward trajectory of four to six percentage points per year. However, since 2011 
adoption levels have plateaued at about 70 percent.  
Income 
Indeed, income has been identified worldwide as the main determinant for the digital 
divide. Our model, however, following van Dijk (2005) (figure 1), suggests that 
socioeconomic inequality is the result of categorical inequalities determined a priori. A 
good example for that determination is figure 5, which demonstrates how the income gap 
between Jews and Palestinians in Israel is constantly growing. While in 2004 the average 
gross income of a Palestinian Israeli family was 7,403 NIS, that of a Jewish family was 
11,926 NIS, a difference of 4,523 NIS, by 2009 the difference grew by 83.5 percent to 
8,299 NIS (10,768 NIS as compared to 19,067 NIS).  
 
 
 
figure 5 (Source: CBS, 2015) 
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Indeed, as figure 6 demonstrates, there is a growing gap between those that have 
and those that do not have Internet access along income levels. While the difference 
between those that use the Internet regularly among people with average income, and 
those that use it among people with low income levels was 16.4 percentage points in 
2002 (37.3 percent versus 21 percent), by 2013 it grew to 38.6 percentage points, more 
than double the difference. In addition, there is a drop in Internet connectivity among the 
low-income group between 2011-2013 of 7.9 percentage points (a drop of more than 17 
percent), compared to a negligent drop of 1.1 percent among those with an average 
income (a drop of 1.4 percent). This decline in connectivity starting in 2011 among all 
groups, in some more pronounced than in others, still needs to be studied as data for 
subsequent years becomes available. Our assumption, though, is that it is a result of the  
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dramatic drop in mobile phone service prices in Israel starting in 2011 as a result of the 
introduction of enhanced competition in the field, combined with the high penetration 
rate of smartphones which resulted in a rise in internet use over mobile devices. 
Population groups: Jews and Palestinians 
The most studied, and most apparent, social cleavage, the national rift between Jews and 
Palestinians, is also one of the examples in which the model’s strength is demonstrated, 
with regards to ICT connectivity as exhibited in figure 6. The gap between Jews 
connected to the Internet and Israeli Palestinians has grown by 17.7 percent (from 21.5 
percentage point difference to 25.3). In a trend resembling that in the income category, 
the penetration level for Internet home connectivity has plateaued for both groups at the  
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levels they were in 2011: around 74 percent among Jews and 49 percent among 
Palestinians. The plateauing of the curve means that the gap has no chance of diminishing 
at any time. 
When adding the effect of income to the gap between Jews and Palestinians, an 
unexpected pattern emerges, a pattern, which indicates that the effect of nationality 
persists among members of the majority and the minority, even with identical income 
levels.10 As figure 7 reveals, not only has the gap between Jews and Palestinians of the 
same income level not shrunk over the years – it has actually grown from 19.4 percentage 
points in 2002 (24.5 percent and 5.1 percent respectively) to 32.1 percentage points (45.4 
percent and 13.3 percent respectively) among the lowest income brackets, and from 12.5 
percentage points (38.9 percent and 26. 4 percent respectively) to 21.9 percentage points 
(79.7 percent and 57.8 percent respectively), between Jews and Palestinians with average 
incomes.  
There can be a number of explanations for this growing gap. Within the attributes 
of the dynamic model, clearly the continued systematic discrimination against Palestinian 
Israelis, which has been documented in numerous studies (i.e. Ghanem, 1998; Coursen-
Neff, 2004; Golan-Agnon, 2006; Tsfati, 2007) is articulated by lessened levels of 
participation in society, which feeds into the growing gap. An additional explanation can 
be the abysmal condition of infrastructures in the Palestinian sector, which contributes to 
low quality of Internet connections thus creating little incentive to purchase the service, 
even for those who can afford it. There is hardly any cable service in Arab towns, and as 
a result, there is no incentive for the telco to upgrade its services, in the lack of 
competition. 
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figure 8 
Immigration: country of origin and generation 
In one category – immigration – we identified a diminishing gap between the 
groups we identified. We looked at four groups: Jewish immigrants (those that were born 
overseas), 2nd generation Jews (those for which at least one parent was an immigrants), 
3rd generation Jews (those for which both parents were born in Israel) and Palestinian 
Israelis. As figure 9 shows, while there is a distinct and significant gap in favor of those 
who are several generations in Israel among the Jews, still the Palestinians none of which 
are immigrants, are at a lower status consistently during the whole time studied, even in 
comparison to first generation Jewish immigrants. 
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On average, the gap between all the groups is shrinking; it has gone down from 
47.6 percentage points between third generation Israelis and Palestinians in 2002 (60.8 
percent and 13.3 percent respectively), to 37.3 percentage points in 2013 (86 percent and 
48.8 percent respectively), a significant drop of 10.3 points (21.6 percent). Between 2002 
and 2013, the gap between third generation Jews and Jewish immigrants shrank from 
32.4 percentage points (60.8 percent and 28.4 percent respectively), to 24.2 percentage 
points (86 percent and 61.9 percent respectively): a significant drop of 10.2 percentage 
points (31.5 percent). It has gone down to a lesser and non-significant extent between 
Jewish immigrants and Palestinians, as the numbers for both these groups are still at the 
bottom of the hierarchy. In 2002, from a 15.1 percentage point difference (28.4 percent 
and 13.3 percent respectively), the gap reduced to 13.1 percentage points (61.9 percent 
and 48.8 percent respectively): a drop of only 2 percentage points (13.2 percent). 
Interestingly, the divide is also shrinking between the different immigrant groups (second 
generation), when comparing their country of origin. Again, those born to Israeli-born 
parents dominate in connectivity, and those born within the Palestinian Israeli community 
are at the bottom of the pyramid. However the gap, as mentioned above, has shrunk by 
21.6 percent. Second to those born to Jewish-Israeli parents, as figure 9 demonstrates are 
those born to immigrants born in Europe/America. The gap there has gone down from 
20.8 to 11.9 percentage points. The gap between those born to Jewish Israeli parents born 
in Israel and those whose parents were born in Asia/Africa, has gone down from 32.1 to 
25.7 percent. The gap has also gone down respectively between each of the descendants 
of immigrant groups and the Palestinian Israelis, however a gap still persists. 
 Nevertheless, when accounting for income among the different immigrant groups, 
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one finds that the trends are more complex, and that yet again the structural 
discrimination between Jews and Palestinians, and this time also within the Jewish 
majority between immigrants and old timers, has a strong effect.  
 
 
figure 9 
Figure 10 illustrates that the gap of connectivity to the Internet has grown over 
the period studied between Jews of all ethnicities and Palestinian Arabs in the low 
income bracket. Yet, it also shows that between third generation Jews and Palestinians 
with low income, the gap has come back to its 2003 size (45.5 percentage points) in 2013 
(46.2 percentage points), as a result of a bigger decline in connectivity within the Jewish 
group, than among the Palestinians between 2010-2013. There is a trend of 
disconnectedness starting in 2011, which still needs to be followed when data regarding 
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subsequent years becomes available, as it does not seem to be consistent. For example, 
with regards to first generation immigrants there is an upward tick in 2012.  
 
 
figure 10 
Exclusion of choice: religiosity 
Religious affiliation among Jews in Israel is determined statistically on a scale 
ranging from Haredi to secular, with in between self-descriptions as religious (which 
differs from Haredi by more acceptance of both modernity and Zionism, which is a 
definition of Judaism as a nation in addition to a religion), traditional religious and 
traditional secular (two open ended identities, based on the respondent’s subjective 
definition of religious observance). 
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figure 11 
What characterizes the Haredi community as described in previous sections, is 
that it is a community that chooses to refrain from accessing the Internet out of fear it 
may compromise religious dogma. Indeed, as figure 11 demonstrates, there is a constant 
gap between the Haredi and the other four groups, and they are all respectively consistent 
in their patterns of adoption, maintaining a more-or-less identical gap over the years. 
The other gaps in this group cannot be explained by religiosity, and need to be 
further studied in relation to socio-economic and educational characteristics of these 
communities.   
ICT use: work, social networking, economic activity 
In addition to analyzing access data, we also looked into the CBS data focusing 
on patterns of usage, concerning those types of use that can be regarded as 
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“participation”, in order to fit within the model. We identified two main arenas of 
participation: economic – using ICTs for work, and other economic activities such as 
shopping online, and social – using ICTs for social activities.  
 
 
figure 12 
As we did not design the questionnaires, nor did we have any control of the data 
gathering, juxtaposing our analysis on the data is challenging, yet it is still telling. 
Interestingly, and with no apparent explanation, there is a shrinking gap regarding usage 
of computers at work between those with average and those with low income. As figure 
12 demonstrates, the level of low-income citizens using computers for work is practically 
identical in 2013 and 2002 (37 and 36 percent respectively), while the ratio of those with 
average income using computers at work had dropped from 70 to 59 percent. 
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However, when introducing nationality to the equation, one can see a dramatic growth of 
the gap between Jews and Palestinians. As figure 13 demonstrates, the gap in usage for 
work between Jews with average income to Jews with low income went down between 
2002 and 2013 from 34 percentage points to only 20 percentage points. 
 
figure 13 
Conversely, the gap between low income Jews and Palestinians grew during the 
same period from 4 percentage points to 33 percentage points – eight times.  Palestinians 
with average income, which were using computers at work significantly more than Jews 
with lower income (70 percent to 36 percent), were by 2013 nearly on par with them (45 
and 41 percent respectively), while their gap with the low income Palestinians stayed 
almost put at 37 percent, compared to 31 percent eleven years earlier. 
PERSISTING DIGITAL DIVIDE IN ISRAEL P. 33 
Unfortunately, the sample sizes for doing shopping online and making payments 
online were very small for these populations, an indication that this particular economic 
activity was yet to pick up in Israel, even as late as 2013. 
When it comes to social activity, it turns out that income has no effect at all. Figure 14 
shows that among low and average income Israelis, social participation levels online are 
identical as have been so for more than a decade.  
 
figure 14 
When it comes to religious identity, the differences in social participation between 
the different groups are striking. Figure 15 and figure 16 show that both, among low 
income Jews and average income Jews, there has been an upward trend of using the 
Internet for social activities; a trend that can be seen in line with the development of Web 
2.0 and social networking applications during the same period. However, in both earning 
brackets, the Haredi community is refraining from participating socially via computers, 
even when they have computers and Internet access. 
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figure 15 
 
figure 16 
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Discussion and conclusion 
The longitudinal presentation and analysis has allowed us to demonstrate that both, van 
Dijk’s model and the expanded version we proposed, are supported by the data. This is a 
first validation of some of the causes for and determinants of digital exclusion in Israel. 
The conclusive evidence is as follows: 
1. There is a growing digital divide along the socioeconomic cleavage between those 
with an average income and those with low income. 
2. There is a growing digital divide along the national cleavage between Jews and 
Palestinian citizens of Israel. 
3. The effect of the national cleavage outweighs that of the socioeconomic cleavage: 
a. Jews and Palestinians with similar income are growing apart when it 
comes to usage of ICTs. 
b. There is a growing gap in ICT use for work between Jews and Palestinians 
with similar income. 
4. The have/have-not gap between ethnic groups within the Jewish majority is 
narrowing, however the minority Palestinian community is behind all Jewish 
ethnic groups. 
5. The religious division’s effect is apparent only with regards to the Haredi 
community when measuring ICT access over time.  
6. Regardless of income level, using the Internet for social uses is identical and there 
is no gap along socioeconomic lines. 
7. Along the religious cleavage, only the Haredi users refuse to utilize the Internet 
for social uses. 
PERSISTING DIGITAL DIVIDE IN ISRAEL P. 36 
8. With regards to using ICT for work, while the gap between low-income workers 
and average income is narrowing, the gap between Jews and Palestinians with 
similar income levels is growing. This outcome corresponds with the growing 
income gap between Jews and Palestinians.  
These conclusions demonstrate that the circular motion from categorical inequalities 
through uneven distribution of resources, and gaps in ICT access and back to the 
reinforcement of the uneven distribution of resources, is indeed a viable motion that can 
be, and has been, validated. The results show that over time the participation of 
Palestinian Israelis in the information economy is growing at a much slower pace than 
among Jews, and the gap between the two communities is thus growing. The dominance 
of the national effect over the economic effect with regards to the growth in disparity 
regarding membership in the information economy strengthens the assumption of the 
model that it is the categorical inequalities that feed the exclusion, that is the outcome of 
the gap in access to ICTs. 
However, when it comes to what has been coined the “ethnic” divide, that among 
different groups of Jews based on the birthplace of their parents and grandparents, we see 
that the divide is getting smaller. Indeed, Israel is an immigrant state when it comes to the 
absorption of Jews, regardless of where they were born, which in Israel is perceived as 
repatriation. As a result, while keeping mostly constant the discriminatory policies 
toward the Palestinian population, gaps between Jews based on ethnic differences are 
sought to be narrowed and eliminated. Although, as in the case of the Ethiopian Jews, not 
always successfully. This outward effort is apparent in the digital adoption patterns we 
discerned from the longitudinal study; the gap among the different Jewish ethnicities is 
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closing, while the gap between Jews and Palestinians is growing, and the Palestinian 
community is constantly less connected than all Jewish ethnicities. 
The cleavage among religious groups the data identifies, justifies the addition we 
made to the model by adding the “personal/collective” differences as a determinant of 
ICT connectivity that is not generated by discrimination emanating from the categorical 
inequalities. Indeed, religious belief in itself does not affect ICT access. The group self-
identifying as “religious” has the same pattern of ICT adoption as the other groups, and is 
identical in adoption levels to the group that is self-defined as “traditional non-religious.” 
However, the one group that stays out of the equation – the Haredi – is adopting ICTs at 
a slow pace that maintains penetration will not grow much beyond its current level and its 
uses of ICTs, even among those that have it differs significantly from that of the rest of 
the population. 
The dynamic of the Haredi pattern of participation is also indicative of what can 
be seen as the expanded model’s most important contributions to the understanding of the 
ICT gap – that disconnectedness should be identified in specific groups and pockets in 
society and not in aggregate numbers along the lines of have/have-not. By analyzing the 
uses made by specific communities with low adoption rates of access, the needs of these 
communities can be asserted, and perhaps models for intervention raising their 
participation level in society can be designed.  
Indeed, what stands out when looking at the trends of uses ICTs are put to, is that 
regardless of income, ICTs are used identically for social uses. However, when 
describing the trend along the religious rift, it is clear that Haredim who use computers 
avoid making social use of them. There could be many explanations for such a choice, 
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yet what it means is that for members of this community, computers are not an 
interpersonal communication tool, even when it serves other needs, which can account to 
the overall low levels of adoption and slow pattern of the adoption curve over time. Since 
other critical needs of this community may be answered by ICTs, such as information 
about health, social services, employment, and so forth, perhaps providing computers that 
address specific needs but don’t put members of the community in “danger” of being 
tempted to use them in socially undesirable ways, is a way to raise connectivity levels 
and serve community needs. 
While the evidence is only circumstantial, one cannot overlook the relationship 
between using computers for work and the growing income gap between Jews and 
Palestinians. On the one hand, the data demonstrate that there is a shrinking gap along the 
socioeconomic line when it comes to computer use for work. It is a finding that requires 
further investigation, as the gap is closed more by a decline in usage among those with 
average income than by a rise in usage by those in the low-income brackets. However, 
with regards to the Palestinian community, the effect is exactly the opposite. Since we 
can clearly observe that there is a growing income gap between Jewish and Palestinian 
households, we can only hypothesize how these two trends are connected. Yet they 
clearly need to be studied if any effort is to be made to close the economic gap that exists 
along national lines. In any case, this trend is one that again validates the model 
Some general observations the longitudinal data provided us highlight other 
elements in the model. Clearly there is a trend to migrate from stationary to mobile 
Internet access. This trend is across income levels, yet it seems to be more pronounced in 
the lower income brackets. ICT characteristics have an effect on connectivity that appears 
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in the model, and which we detailed to include the four characteristics that differentiate 
contemporary ICTs from their predecessors: abundance of information and channels, 
interactivity, multimediality and mobility (Schejter & Tirosh 2014; 2015). Yet, Internet 
connection based only on mobile access to the web still comes at the expense of the other 
three components. Mobile Internet is currently a constrained form of access in terms of 
speed of connectivity and the amount of data that can be accessed and stored (Napoli & 
Obar, 2014; Noam, 2011). Identifying this trend both revalidates the model and switches 
on a warning light regarding the opening of a technological divide, yet another element 
critical to understanding digital exclusion. 
The longitudinal analysis of ICT pattern and use between 2002-2013, and its 
juxtaposition against the social cleavages that characterize Israeli society, serve as an 
important tool to understand Israeli society and the structure of the Israeli information 
society. The model we adopted and adapted to the Israeli reality, demonstrates the effect 
of power on ICT access and on the development of digital exclusion patterns. It helped 
validate the existence of a power imbalance in Israeli society, in particular between Jews 
and Palestinians, and the effect of internal power affliction in closed communities, as is 
demonstrated in the internal isolationist trend of the Haredi community and its broad 
impact on that community. 
While much more can be learned by honing the analytical tools that can be used 
to understand CBS data, the effort of framing digital exclusion in a dynamic model has 
proven to be informative and telling of a society in a persistent mode of information 
inequality. 
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